District Judge Raymond A. Jackson used a play on words to protect a band of wrongdoers in Bland v. Roberts Civil Action No. 4:11cv45. Some may see through District Judge Jackson's opinion of April 24, 2012, others may not. But, that's where the American Judicial System can become a quagmire of "Judicial Stealthy Hubristic Injustice Tactics."
Many know that I am not an attorney at law. The Gaming Oracle has not graduated from a law school. But, as a pro se litigant I have come to understand the law, and I can make my own interpretations of the law just as all are allowed too. You may not agree with my interpretations, and you have every right to do so, but check my record, and you will find that my presentations are based in fact and law.
Upon my observation of a recent news story on Judge Jackson's ruling I was compelled to investigate the case. The issues just didn't sit right as they were reported by the media. Why? Well the media reported that this judge ruled that what one "likes" and "+1's" on Facebook and G+ are not Constitutionally protected speech.
Let's take a look-see. After the "lookie-lookie" I will show you where, and how the "JSHIT" slinging begins. (Newbies to Gaming Oracle's articles should bring themselves up to speed as to what "JSHIT" is by viewing: "JSHIT: Judicial Stealthy Hubristic Injustice Tactics."
Are actions we take on the internet protected speech? In Gresham v. City of Atlanta, 1:10-CV-1301-RWS-ECS, 2011 WL 4601022, (N.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2011), District Judge Richard W. Story stated under the heading "1. Did Plaintiff speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern?" that:
The Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff's Facebook posting addressed a matter of public concern, specifically, "the integrity of the law enforcement services" provided to the public by the Atlanta Police Department (APD). Although the Court considers this a close question, the Court accepts the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that Plaintiff's speech did pertain to an issue of public concern and thus is entitled to First Amendment protection.
Give or take a day or two, from the above ruling in Georgia, the District Court in Arkansas held within Mattingly v. Milligan, 4:11-cv-00215, under section "III A. Free Speech" that:
And as noted, the termination decisions were a matter of public concern. The Court cannot grant summary judgment on the ground that no reasonable person could have understood Mattingly's Facebook posts to be speech on a matter of public concern because there is evidence in the record to the contrary.
Before December 2010, it was clearly established that a public employer may not fire an employee for speech relating to a matter of public concern where that speech causes no disruption to the workplace. See Pickering, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731; Connick, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S. Ct. 1684. Milligan is not entitled to qualified immunity for retaliating against Mattingly because of her Facebook posts.
Okay, from the above two cases we see that those courts have said that speech on a Facebook page amounts to matters of public concern if they are in the context of expressing a matter of public concern. Some may want to read the above cases in their entirety, so that they can fully understand how the context and the number of people seeing the evidence is applied, and what is a matter of public concern. But…
In order for me to relate how JSHIT is brought into the Bland v. Roberts case I'll have to show you how Judge Jackson relied upon obscure language, and or intentionally skirting around, and or making an issue out of a non-issue regardless of the facts, here as I want to reveal that his opinion resounds in JSHIT.
To understand my argument, consider this. What if a dictator of a country with nuclear weapons gets pissed when the United States enacts an embargo against his country, and he presses the launch button. Question, is that an expression of war against the United States, or an oop's, because the dictator did not post his intentions to bomb the U.S. on Facebook, nor let any one else know how pissed he was?
Well the above is similar to what Judge Jackson is saying in his opinion. He has the hubris to say that:
These illustrative cases differ markedly from the case at hand in one crucial way: Both Gresham and Mattingly involved actual statements. No such statements exist in this case. Simply liking a Facebook page is insufficient. It is not the kind of substantive statement that has previously warranted constitutional protection. The Court will not attempt to infer the actual content of Carter's posts from one click of a button on Adams' Facebook page. For the Court to assume that the Plaintiffs made some specific statement without evidence of such statements is improper. Facebook posts can be considered matters of public concern; however, the Court does not believe Plaintiffs Carter and McCoy have alleged sufficient speech to garner First Amendment protection.
Here is where we all need understanding of the law so that we understand the differences between matters of first impression, stare decisis, and that of creating conflicts between the circuits. If Judge Jackson was not sure as to how to apply the law correctly he should have deferred the case. Or he should pray that our hypothetical never occurs and his house doesn't become ground zero of the dictators non-expression of intent.
Instead of deferring Judge Jackson's current opinion is replete with what could be construed as obscure statements. From my interactions with our legal system I have learned that our law makers have become versed in the art of obscure language. They use this tactic to skirt precedents, and conceal corruption and plunder in legislation and common law that they assume no one will take the time to read and analyze.
You don't have to agree with my assessments above, but those in doubt can refer to the statements of some of our past legislators and lobbyist's own discourse on the subject as I have shared within an article entitled "Abramoff Should Be Flattered." In that article I shared links to actual video's wherein Mr. Abramoff and former congressmen actually stated that this practice of using obscure language was the norm.
Hence, you will note that Judge Jackson actually cites the Gresham and Mattingly cases but explains them away by saying that the pressing of a "like" button on Facebook can not be construed as expressing ones intent. Being that you are reading this on the internet, can you imagine the millions on contracts that can now be deemed void, because by pressing an accept button we should not be held to have shown our intent to accept the terms of the countless agreements we enter on the millions upon millions of offers and agreements we click upon.
Not all will be in a position to agree with this article, because they can not write a comment below due to that same comment exhibiting their agreement. This especially holds true for all of the lawyers that follow my blogs. They can not run the risk of ratifying the words of a pro se litigant, and come under the whip of judges and colleague's that see such affiliations.
So this type of behavior goes on and on. No one has the courage to stand up for the truth, and thousands of judicial officers shirk their oaths to uphold the Constitution of the United States of America, and further inhibit the advancement of the law. Again, lawyer's are supposed to seek this according to the Rules of Professional Conduct, but then again I guess not at the risk of ridicule.
Lastly, in closing, let me point out to you that judge Jackson also says:
"The Sheriff alleges that one of the reasons he terminated Dixon was for violating the Standards of Conduct when he used profanity towards a co-worker. See Def.'s Mem. Law Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 9. The Sheriff alleges that "[w]hen Dixon exited the election booth, in referring to Sheriff Roberts' campaign literature, he told Frances Pope, `you can take this f____ing s____, and throw it in the trash can.'"
Technology will be the downfall of many judicial officers, why? Copy Bland v. Roberts from this link, and you will find that judge Jackson fills his opinion with references to the various depositions taken in the case. But when one does a search for "Dep." he or she will find 35 matches yet none corresponding to a deposition of Frances Pope, whom the sheriff says that he fired on of the plaintiff's for use of profanity directed towards Ms. Pope. Hmm?
Thank you for viewing and I welcome any comments, and I will do my best to meet any cross-claims based in fact and law to my above argument.
Gaming Oracle Observer!