District Judge
Raymond A. Jackson used a play on words to protect a band of wrongdoers in
Bland v. Roberts Civil Action No. 4:11cv45.
Some may see through District Judge Jackson's opinion of April 24, 2012, others may
not. But, that's where the American Judicial System can
become a quagmire of "Judicial Stealthy Hubristic Injustice Tactics."
Many know that I am
not an attorney at law. The Gaming
Oracle has not graduated from a law
school. But, as a pro se litigant I
have come to understand the law, and I can make my own interpretations of the
law just as all are allowed too. You
may not agree with my interpretations, and you have every right to do so, but
check my record, and you will find that my presentations are based in fact and
law.
Upon my observation
of a recent news story on Judge Jackson's ruling I was compelled to investigate
the case. The issues just didn't sit
right as they were reported by the media.
Why? Well the media reported that
this judge ruled that what one "likes" and "+1's" on
Facebook and G+ are not Constitutionally protected speech.
Let's take a
look-see. After the
"lookie-lookie" I will show you where, and how the "JSHIT"
slinging begins. (Newbies to Gaming Oracle's articles should bring themselves
up to speed as to what "JSHIT" is by viewing: "JSHIT: Judicial Stealthy Hubristic Injustice Tactics."
Are actions we take
on the internet protected speech? In Gresham v. City of Atlanta, 1:10-CV-1301-RWS-ECS, 2011
WL 4601022, (N.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2011), District Judge Richard W. Story stated
under the heading "1. Did Plaintiff speak as a citizen on a matter of
public concern?" that:
The Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff's
Facebook posting addressed a matter of public concern, specifically, "the
integrity of the law enforcement services" provided to the public by
the Atlanta Police Department (APD). Although the Court considers
this a close question, the Court accepts the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that Plaintiff's
speech did pertain to an issue of public concern and thus is entitled to First
Amendment protection.
Give or take a day
or two, from the above ruling in Georgia, the District Court in Arkansas held
within Mattingly v. Milligan, 4:11-cv-00215,
under section "III A. Free Speech" that:
And as noted, the termination decisions were a matter
of public concern. The Court cannot grant summary judgment on the ground that
no reasonable person could have understood Mattingly's Facebook posts to be speech
on a matter of public concern because
there is evidence in the record to the contrary.
Before December 2010, it was clearly established that
a public
employer may not fire an employee for speech relating to a matter of public
concern where that speech causes no
disruption to the workplace. See Pickering, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.
Ct. 1731; Connick, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S. Ct. 1684. Milligan is not entitled to
qualified immunity for retaliating against Mattingly because of her
Facebook posts.
Okay, from the above
two cases we see that those courts have said that speech on a Facebook page
amounts to matters of public concern if they are in the context of expressing a
matter of public concern. Some may want
to read the above cases in their entirety, so that they can fully understand
how the context and the number of people seeing the evidence is applied, and
what is a matter of public concern. But…
In order for me to
relate how JSHIT is brought into the Bland v. Roberts case I'll have to show
you how Judge Jackson relied upon obscure language, and or intentionally
skirting around, and or making an issue out of a non-issue regardless of the
facts, here as I want to reveal that his
opinion resounds in JSHIT.
To understand my
argument, consider this. What if a
dictator of a country with nuclear weapons gets pissed when the United States
enacts an embargo against his country, and he presses the launch
button. Question, is that an expression
of war against the United States, or an oop's, because the dictator did not
post his intentions to bomb the U.S. on Facebook, nor let any one else know how
pissed he was?
Well the above is
similar to what Judge Jackson is saying in his opinion. He has the hubris to say that:
These illustrative cases differ markedly from the
case at hand in one crucial way: Both Gresham and Mattingly involved
actual statements. No such statements exist in this case. Simply liking a Facebook page is insufficient. It is not the kind of substantive statement that has
previously warranted constitutional protection. The Court will not attempt to
infer the actual content of Carter's posts from one click of a button on Adams' Facebook page. For the Court to assume that the Plaintiffs made
some specific statement without evidence of such statements is improper. Facebook
posts can be considered matters of public concern; however, the Court does not believe Plaintiffs
Carter and McCoy have alleged sufficient speech to garner First Amendment
protection.
Here is where we all
need understanding of the law so that we understand the differences between
matters of first impression, stare decisis, and that of creating conflicts
between the circuits. If Judge Jackson
was not sure as to how to apply the law correctly he should have deferred the
case. Or he should pray that our hypothetical never occurs and his house doesn't become ground zero of the dictators non-expression of intent.
Instead of deferring
Judge Jackson's current opinion is replete with what could be construed as
obscure statements. From my interactions with our legal system I have learned
that our law makers have become versed in the art of obscure language. They use this tactic to skirt precedents, and
conceal corruption and plunder in legislation and common law that they assume
no one will take the time to read and analyze.
You don't have to
agree with my assessments above, but those in doubt can refer to the statements
of some of our past legislators and lobbyist's own discourse on the subject as I have shared
within an article entitled "Abramoff Should Be Flattered." In that article
I shared links to actual video's wherein Mr. Abramoff and former congressmen
actually stated that this practice of using obscure language was the norm.
Hence, you will note
that Judge Jackson actually cites the Gresham and Mattingly cases but
explains them away by saying that the pressing of a "like" button on
Facebook can not be construed as expressing ones intent. Being that you are
reading this on the internet, can you imagine the millions on contracts that
can now be deemed void, because by pressing an accept button we should not be
held to have shown our intent to accept the terms of the countless agreements
we enter on the millions upon millions of offers and agreements we click upon.
Not all will be in a
position to agree with this article, because they can not write a comment below
due to that same comment exhibiting their agreement. This especially holds true for all of the
lawyers that follow my blogs. They can
not run the risk of ratifying the words of a pro se litigant, and come under
the whip of judges and colleague's that see such affiliations.
So this type of
behavior goes on and on. No one has the
courage to stand up for the truth, and thousands of judicial officers shirk
their oaths to uphold the Constitution of the United States of America, and
further inhibit the advancement of the law.
Again, lawyer's are supposed to seek this according to the Rules of
Professional Conduct, but then again I guess not at the risk of ridicule.
Lastly, in closing,
let me point out to you that judge Jackson also says:
"The Sheriff alleges that one of the reasons he
terminated Dixon was for violating the Standards of Conduct when he used
profanity towards a co-worker. See Def.'s Mem. Law Supp. Mot. Summ.
J. at 9. The Sheriff alleges that "[w]hen Dixon exited the election booth,
in referring to Sheriff Roberts' campaign literature, he told Frances Pope, `you can take this f____ing s____, and throw it in
the trash can.'"
Technology will be
the downfall of many judicial officers, why?
Copy Bland v. Roberts from this link, and
you will find that judge Jackson fills his opinion with references to the
various depositions taken in the case.
But when one does a search for "Dep." he or she will find 35
matches yet none corresponding to a deposition of Frances Pope, whom the
sheriff says that he fired on of the plaintiff's for use of profanity directed
towards Ms. Pope. Hmm?
Thank you for
viewing and I welcome any comments, and I will do my best to meet any
cross-claims based in fact and law to my above argument.
Gaming Oracle
Observer!
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